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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) has been at the cored of Operational Technology (OT) 
used in industries and process plants to monitor and control critical processes, especially in the energy sector. In 
petroleum sub-sector, it has been used in monitoring transportation, storage and loading of petroleum products. 
It is linked to instruments that collect and monitor parameters such as temperature, pressure and product 
densities. It gives commands to actuators by the use of the application programs installed on the programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs). Earlier SCADA systems were isolated from the internet, hence protected by an airgap 
from attacks taking place on interconnected systems. The recent trend is that SCADA systems are becoming 
more integrated with other business systems using Internet technologies such as Ethernet and TCP/IP. However, 
TCP/IP and web technologies which are predominantly used by IT systems have become increasingly 
vulnerable to cyberattacks that are experienced by IT systems such as malwares and other attacks.  It is 
important to conduct vulnerability assessment of SCADA systems with a view to thwarting attacks that can 
exploit such vulnerabilities. Where the vulnerabilities have been exploited, forensic analysis is required so as to 
know what really happened. This paper reviews SCADA systems configuration, vulnerabilities, and attacks 
scenarios, then presents a prototype SCADA system and forensic tool that can be used on SCADA. The tool 
reads into the PLC memory and Wireshark has been to capture network communication between the SCADA 
system and the PLC. 
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1. Introduction  
Modern Critical national Infrastructure such as electricity, Oil and gas, water and manufacturing industries rely 
heavily on computer systems, networks, control systems and embedded devices in order to provide safe and 
reliable operations. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems form part of a process control, 
which are used in manufacturing processes, chemical plant and refinery operations and even for automation and 
climate control in buildings.  In a typical SCADA system, sensors acquire data pertaining to process behavior. 
This data is passed to control algorithms implemented in the SCADA systems [1]. SCADA systems are used to 
automate industrial processes, such as power generation and distribution, gas and oil pipelines as well as water 
and waste management [2] . Their primary design requirement is safety, which typically requires real-time 
response to changes in the monitored processes and an ability to handle harsh working environment; they were 
never designed to withstand cyber-attacks of any kind. Early SCADA systems were deployed in specialized 
isolated networks, which are not connected with corporate networks or the Internet. Thus, they were protected 
from remote cyber-attacks by virtue of not being accessible over the Internet. SCADA systems let you monitor 
and control various remote functions and processes by using modem communication links between master and 
remote locations. The smooth and reliable operation of SCADA systems is vital for such sectors of critical 
infrastructure such as energy, water and transportation where both data acquisition and control are critically 
important. Major SCADA systems collect data, monitor and control field instruments by the help of 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) that act as the slaves to the SCADA system. A PLC has an application 
program, a firmware and the hardware itself that has several security vulnerabilities from its design. As they 
cover large geographical areas, SCADA systems typically use Wide Area Networks (WAN). The 
communication infrastructure may be satellite, radio, power line based and any combination of the above. These 
systems are designed to provide real time sensor data on the physical dynamics. A SCADA architecture 
comprises two levels: a master or client level at the supervisory control center and a slave or data server level 
that interacts with the processes under control. In addition to the hardware, the software components of the 
SCADA architecture are important. SCADA systems generally consist of sensors, actuators, programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs), and a human machine interface (HMI) [3]. A PLC is deployed at a remote field site to 
provide immediate monitoring and control of a physical process, it functions as a slave. It sends control signals 
to the device under control, acquires data from them which it transmits to the master terminal units. HMI and 
other SCADA services (such as engineering workstation and historian) run at a control center and provide the 
means for operators to remotely observe and control the processes [4]. Worms such as Stuxnet [5] which was 
uncovered in 2010, proved a new sophisticated level era of attacks against a PLC based system. It was able to 
exploit other machines to initialize attacks on them. It demonstrated a real sophisticated cyber security attack 
that catastrophically affected several areas of PLC-BS. By attacking the software (HMIs—WinCC, PLC 
codes—Siemens Simatic Step7, PCs—Windows, etc) and faking values, Stuxnet severely affected crucial field 
devices taking advantage of multiple Windows zero days vulnerabilities [6]. There are many other malware 
attacks on PLCS such as Flame, Guass, Duqu, wiper and black energy [5] which have been reported. Owing to 
the nature of processes controlled by SCADA systems, such as nuclear reactors in electricity and pipelines in oil 
and gas, a cyber-attack on them can not only lead to loss of resources but also negatively impact on human 
health, safely and environment. In fact, these compromises will almost likely be fatal. The operational 
International Journal of Computer (IJC) (2020) Volume 38, No  1, pp 209-221 
 
211 
technologies such as SCADA, which are used to manage the national Critical Infrastructure are at the center of 
economic wellbeing of a nation and therefore needs to be secured from cyber-attacks. This has never been more 
urgent than in this age of terrorism, industrial espionage and international geo-political hostilities that are 
prevalent today. In the events that such attacks occur, it should be possible to re-construct what took place 
before, during and after the attacks. It therefore calls for a need to have technologies, toolkits and mechanism in 
place to protect such infrastructure. The challenge however is that while a lot of research has been done in IT 
and a plethora of cyber security tools and technologies have been developed to deal with vulnerabilities and 
other cybersecurity issues in the IT domain, not a similar effort has been seen in the domain of Operational 
Technology. This is mainly because, as mentioned earlier, OT networks have never been interconnected with 
the business networks and also of the fact that for a long time OT has never been built on top of TCP/IP protocol 
suite. Incidentally, the most common OT communication protocols such as Modbus [7] are known to be 
inherently vulnerable to commons cyber-attacks since they send data in plaintext. This paper seeks to bridge this 
gap between IT and OT cybersecurity practices with specific reference to SCADA systems. We review SCADA 
systems configuration, vulnerabilities, and attacks scenarios then present a prototype SCADA system and 
forensic tool that can be used on SCADA. The tool reads into the PLC memory and Wireshark has been to 
capture network communication between the SCADA system and the PLC. The rest of this document is 
organized as follows. In section two, we review vulnerabilities in SCADA system and SCADA forensics as well 
as related research works then in section three, we present the prototype SCADA system and the toolkit we have 
used to demonstrate SCADA forensics. In section four we present and discuss results from the toolkit. Section 
five presents our conclusion and recommendations for further research works. 
2. Related information and research works 
2.1 Vulnerabilities and threats in SCADA Systems  
Most of the modern SCADA systems have moved from the isolated case, to more interoperable and open 
standards for cost efficiency and integration into management IT systems. Communication is now common over 
Ethernet TCP/IP including more standardized control protocols and applications. Thus, SCADA systems are 
now susceptible to external attacks and IT based vulnerabilities [8]. The major attack vectors in SCADA control 
systems are through; Backdoors and holes in the network perimeter, especially in the configuration of ―Air 
Gaps‖ or links to corporate enterprise IT infrastructure. Further, the operating system of PLCs, often known as a 
firmware lacks security features such as certificates and cryptography or intrusion detection through expected 
response found in normal IT operating systems [9]. If the Operating System (firmware) is compromised by a 
hacker, all the devices controlled by PLCs, can be completely taken over; opening the door to varieties of 
malicious attacks and threats.  Another point of vulnerability in the SCADA system is the Human Machine 
Interface (HMI). This can be an application software or a user interface terminal which includes the Display 
Terminal Unit (DTU) which is used by the operator to control and monitor the system and the Historian 
Terminal Unit (HTU) which is a logging device. These two units are based on servers or PC units and run on the 
operating system of the PC its installed in. Like any other computers in the IT domain, they are vulnerable to 
threats within the network and inherit all the vulnerabilities of the underlying Operating System. For instance, 
HMIs have become generic or off-shelf software products that are built on or shared common architecture 
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computers or IT systems like Windows OS, ActiveX, Java, [5]. Attacking any HMI, including its related 
database, could lead to severe consequences on software (including but not limited to deleting or manipulating 
codes, alarms, or database records) as well as on hardware. Attacks on software typically take advantages of 
unsecured networks or infected devices to create software manipulation or to steal confidential information 
[5,10].  
2.2 Forensic artefacts from a SCADA system 
An artefact is a piece of data that may be relevant to the investigation. This artefact can be obtained from 
various levels of a SCADA system as depicted on figure 1. These artefacts may include: 
a. PLC application program and settings 
b. Network traffic  
c. Engineering workstation memory and program 
d. Field devices such as process logs, date and time  
e. HMI Logs and settings  
Modification of a PLC memory can be recorded as a digital forensic artefact, which can be used to reconstruct a 
timeline of events [11]. Encase scripts have been used to carry out network acquisition to test the effects of a 
forensic tool on a SCADA system. The result showed that the test on network acquisition have minimal effects 
on the normal operation of a SCADA system. Memory addresses in a PLC are rarely modified. If a change 
happens then this can be recorded as a change in the programming code or logic. A capture of a PLC memory 
addresses would form a useful forensic artefact, that will assist to capture volatile data for digital forensic on a 
SCADA system.  
 
Figure 1: Levels of forensics to be used on the test bed 
2.3 Related research works in SCADA Security and forensics 
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2.3.1 Digital Forensic Analysis of Industrial Control Systems Using Sandboxing: A Case of WAMPAC 
Applications in the Power Systems 
The use of digital forensics in the domain of operational technology is quite limited, most of the research 
focuses on SCADA systems, the power of connectivity and control of power systems especially the substations 
makes them more challenging to protect this critical control systems.  Asif Iqbal and his colleagues suggested 
the use of Sandboxing to test and analyze Malware in an OT environment [12], they implemented and 
improvised a forensic test bed by implementing a sandboxing technique in the context of a real time hardware in 
the loop setup. this is done by running a suspicious code without impacting the host, in OT systems, the stability 
of the system is key to the normal running of the controlled environment. The authors were able to map different 
attacks in a WAMPAC application, by designing a real time hardware forensic testbed to be used to conduct 
investigations on power systems especially on substations, the authors were able to carry out analysis on the 
power substation testbed, by analyzing the attacks from a worm. the study however could not be used to capture 
the PLC memory which holds key forensic artefacts especially after an attack.  
2.3.2 SCADA Systems: Challenges for Forensic Investigators, when Security incidents occur in SCADA 
systems  
Several challenges exist while conducting forensic investigation in systems which are required to be running full 
time to control and monitor industrial and infrastructure processes such as pipeline operations, power 
generations, fuel depots , building managements systems , hospitals and other critical installations, resent attacks 
on a SCADA systems such as the Stuxnet and Flame malwares highlighted the need to carry out forensic 
investigations on a SCADA system [6]. Irfan and his colleagues [13]  divided the SCADA system into 5 layers, 
the authors indicated that forensic analysis on SCADA system takes place on layer 0-2. This layer entails the 
field instruments, PLCS and RTUs and the Local HMIs. Irfan and his colleagues [13] outlined the manager 
challenges experienced while carrying out SCADA forensics  due to its nature of operation and set up, this 
includes:- live forensics, the SCADA system must be continuously operational a forensic investigator cannot tun 
it off, this affects the capturing of volatile data,  SCADA systems also has a deterministic network traffic, that is 
the component’s communicate with others in a predefined manner, an installed intrusion detection system can 
be configured to consider a certain communication pattern as normal. This may lead to rising of false alarm or 
lead to the firewall blocking the forensic investigators machine and SCADA components during data 
acquisition. Another major challenge for a SCADA investigator is the customized SCADA components 
operating system kernels, resource constrained devices, such as CPU, Memory and input and output devices. 
Field devices such as PLCS / RTUS are generally resource constrained. In adequate logging of the SCADA 
systems which are geared towards process disturbances not security breaches.  
2.3.3 Forensic Analysis of SCADA/ICS System with Security and Vulnerability Assessment 
SCADA systems are used in industrial control systems (ICS) to remotely collect real time data to control and 
automate networked equipment’s. Due to this interconnection, SCADA systems do experience serious security 
experiences and breaches such as intrusion attacks which may not only lead to financial and data losses but 
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serious environmental and health issues. Proper forensic investigations right after the incident is required to 
prevent loss of forensic evidence [14] Umit and his colleagues [14] designed a lab for the study of a SCADA 
system to be used to analyze SCADA/ICS for vulnerabilities , testing and exploiting the system weaknesses 
using penetration tools and analyzing the system for forensic artefacts. And analysis of this artefacts although 
the authors were able to develop a SCADA testbed, and carry out forensic analysis they lacked a forensic tool to 
collect this artefact from the testbed. This is a key requirement and an important step for collection of forensic 
artefacts from a SCADA system 
3. SCADA forensic toolkit implementation 
In this section we describe the testbed implementation including the testbed and the forensic toolkit.  
3.1 Testbed Implementation 
We set out to implement a toolkit for conducting digital forensics on SCADA systems. To achieve this, we set 
up a testbed to collect digital artifacts from a SCADA system, based on a prototype of a pipeline transporting 
petroleum product from one pump station to the next depot. The testbed is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: prototype set up 
The testbed was realized using the following components: 
i. PLC: We used Modicon M340 PLC consisting of a CPU, input and output modules, a power supply 
module, a communication module and a rack. The PLC was programmed using Ecostruxure control 
expert programming software. 
ii. Input module: BMX DDI 1602 input modules connected to toggle switches and push buttons were used 
to represent field instruments 
iii.  BMXDDO1602 discrete output module connected to six LEDS and a Motor connected to the output 




The PLC and the physical computer were connected via an Ethernet switch. Two Virtual Machines are running 
SCADA services, the HMI and the engineering workstation running Ecostruxure control. 
The PC station also known as the Engineering work station runs the Ecostructure control expert, the Modicon 
PLC programming software and the Citec HMI software. The Engineering software can read and write into the 
PLC and also change the SCADA settings and parameters set.  
The Master workstation has the following pieces of software installed: 
i. Windows 10 professional operating system 
ii. Ecostructure Control expert software  
iii. Citet Vijeo Scada Software  
iv. Ettercap 
v. Autopsy 
vi. Wireshark  
vii. Unity Differencial software 
viii. Developed Tool  
All the power required by the PLC and the indicator switches is supplied by a 24v DV power supply. Wired to a 
240V supply. The PLC was programmed to control a typical pipeline using ladder logic as per IEC 61131-3  
using the Ecostruxure control expert, the petroleum product runs from one terminal to the next to be stored in a 
tank, the product is pumped by a booster pump, the pipeline is monitored with flow, density and temperature 
sensors to ensure the correct product at the correct safety levels are transferred. Alarms shown on the HMI are 
PLC communication failures, control power lost, and valve opening delay. A communication alarm is raised 
when communication is lost between PLC and the HMI.  HMI acts as the Master and communicates with the 
PLC requesting for the information as per the commands issued 
To program a PLC several languages according to IEC 61131-3, this language are as follows;  
a. Ladder diagrams (LD) 
b. Sequential function charts (SFC) 
c. Structured texts (ST) 
d. Instruction list (IL) 
e. Function blocks diagram (FBD) 
Wireshark was used to capture the communication between the PLC and the HMI, the results are as indicated in 
appendix 1, this was done prior to launch of attack and when the PLC is obtaining commands from the PLC.  
The HMI sent a command to the PLC initiating a valve open, Ettercap was used to generate MITM attacks on 
both the Master and slave, this attack depicted man in the middle attacks on the PLC and on the HMI, this 
combines with the filter modified any Modbus TCP command to change the signal sent to the Modbus slave, the 
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forensic of a SCADA system can be split into three level as per the figure below The ladder logic was adopted 
as depicted on figure 5.3 a and b below was used, this was created using ecostruxure control expert and placed 
on the PLC using a USB port built on the plc.  
 
Figure 3: ladder Logic program code in ecostruxure software 
 
Figure 4: Ladder Logic program code in ecostruxure software 
A HMI project was written on Citec SCADA  and ran on the master workstation  to interact with the PLC, we 
read and wrote into different memory . using the HMI and tool communication we captured communication and 
analyzed it forensically. Using the tools  




Figure 5: HMI Screen of the SCADA implementation of the prototype 
 
Figure 6: Test bed circuit fabrication 
Unity diff software from Schneider electric was used to compare two application programs files. This is 
necessary when comparing ZEF, STU and XEF programs and in detecting anything added, deleted and 
modified. If an authorized access has taken place and program parameters edited, this program will be able to 
tell the difference between the two projects. This data was captured and analyzed using Hex toolkit to read into 
the hex data. We started by sending commands to the PLC from the HMI. The commands sent were: open-
valve, close-valve and read register values. 
3.2 Prototype tool to read and write into the PLC  
We built a tool to read the current memory addresses of the PLC to extract some artefacts from the PLC using 
the Modbus TCP/IP. Modbus TCP/IP communicates via port 502. Setting a PLC communication using the 
Easymodbus library, we can read into the PLC and capture current settings. The tool consists of 3 functional 
modules. Read, write and display current register setting. The application was created using C#. Once installed 
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the IP address of the PLC must be set.  
3.2.1 Application capability  
The application has a capability of reading the PLC on specific registers and record current register status. To 
test the tool the application above was written and SCADA system run, we used the tool to read into the PLC 
and get current PLC settings in hexadecimals.   
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 7:Tool used to read PLC memory 
From the engineering workstation, it was possible to obtain and analyse using a hexfile reader. STU or STA 
program, code. For this case WINHEX was used to read into a STU program that is generated when a 
programme is created in the control expert program, data below was captured  
 
Figure 8: STU Program 
4.1 Analyses 
Wireshark software was used to evaluate the network communication between the master and the slave, from 
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the PCap capture below confirms that frame 17 had a unit id of 0, function code to read a register and a word 
count of 1. 
 
Figure 9: MAster to PLC Pcap file analysis 
The PLC gives a response back in frame 19 to the master to confirm register number 99 within its Modbus TCP 
packet as illustrated in fig  
 
Figure 10: PLC to Master packet analysis 
Finally, in frame 20 an acknowledgement from the master workstation to the PLC was sent to convey that the 
Modbus TCP communication was complete. The entire communication of query response and 
acknowledgement is as in the figure 6.23 below.  
 
Figure 11: query response and acknowledgement 
The created forensic tool has a capability of reading a program task currently running on a PLC and the values 
of the all registers on the PLC. The tool is written in C# and is designed in three parts one is the GUI part the 
other offers communication t6o the PLC to avoid a delay or affecting the PLC cycle time, with the tool we were 
able to acquire the program from the PLC in binary. This code can be analyzed using a hex tool. this digital 
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artefact can be used to analyze the program on the PLC to check for any change on the application  
4.2 Performance Evaluation of the tool  
This is done by evaluating the time it takes the tool to capture the hex file from the PLC. The time is calculated 
from the time the connect button is hit until the time the data is captured by the tool. the tool takes around 8 
seconds to get the data from a plc   
5. Conclusions and further research  
Modern day attackers are not only focusing on IT but also on Operational technology that includes SCADA 
systems and DCS systems, due to the interconnection of the SCADA systems into the internet , their 
interconnected systems such as the PLC also forms part of the targeted system as it holds the application that 
collects and controls field instruments,. PLC and industrial control protocols don’t have security as part of their 
configuration. From our research once an attacker gains access to the SCADA network they can manipulate start 
and stop the PLC and change the programs therein. In this research we were able to capture a control program 
from a plc that may be analysed using a hex program, to connect the plc from the tool we did use the PLC IP 
address the Modbus TCP/IP Ethernet port 502. We were also able to capture communication between the PLC 
and the SCADA system and analyze it. This captured digital artefacts can be used to retrace the attack trail on 
this critical system. In addition to collect digital artefacts using Modbus TCP/IP the tool was tested using 
Modicon M340 PLC. Further research is needed to test the tool with other PLCS that support Modbus TCP/IP 
and with other industrial control protocols. 
6.    Recommendations                                    
The tool was used to capture the program code saved in Modcon M340 PLC used as a slave by the SCADA 
system. The tool needs to be tested on other PLCs using Modbus TCP/IP protocol for communication. 
Further research needs to be done and reconfigure the tool to capture artefacts from other ICS protocols such 
as Profibus, DNP3 and EthernetI/P   
7. Research Limitations  
This research was limited to a Modicon M340 PLC using Modbus TCP/IP communication protocol.  
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